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ON WHAT IS REAL
IN NĀGĀRJUNA’S “MIDDLE WAY”
RICHARD H. JONES

ABSTRACT: It has become popular to portray the Buddhist Nāgārjuna as an ontological
nihilist, i.e., that he denies the reality of entities and does not postulate any further reality. A
reading of his works does show that he rejects the self-existent reality of entities, but it also
shows that he accepts a "that-ness" (tattva) to phenomenal reality that survives the denial of
any distinct, self-contained entities. Thus, he is not a nihilist concerning what is real in the final
analysis of things. How Nāgārjuna’s positions impact contemporary discussions of ontological
nihilism and deflationism in Western philosophy is also discussed.
Keywords: Buddhist studies, comparative philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy, religion

In the abstract, Nāgārjuna’s basic argument is this fairly straightforward: For something
to be real (sat, sadbhūtam), it must be permanent and unchangingCit cannot arise,
change in any way, or cease to be.1 Thus, for anything that is composed of parts (a
bhāva) or is a basic component of our experienced world (a dharma) to be real, it must
be eternal—it never comes into being from causes and conditions (since whatever is
eternal never arose) or ceases (since that would be a change). It must also be
unchanging during its existence (since a change would not be eternal). So too, it is not
created by anything else or in any way dependent upon anything else (since it would
then not have its own independent reality). Nor can it affect anything else (since that
would involve a change). Thus, it must exist by its very own power. So too, its very
nature cannot change in any way or be the result of any dependence upon something
else. In sum, what is real exists totally independently of all other things and any causes
or conditions. Thus, it must be self-contained in both its nature and existence. In short,
it must exist by its own existence (sva-bhāva).
But, Nāgārjuna argues, if everything were permanent, unaffectable, and
________________________
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The basic criterion of permanence and immutability for what is truly real is shared by Advaita
Vedāntins and early Greek philosophers, not only Parmenides.
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unchanging, we could never become enlightened—we would be stuck permanently in
our current unenlightened state. Buddhist praxis would be meaningless, and suffering
(duḥkha) could never be ended. Indeed, nothing would work if things existed by selfexistence (since nothing totally self-contained could ever change). But we do see things
arise, change, and cease to be. In fact, we see that everything internal and external is
subject to arising, changing, and ceasing dependent upon causes and conditions. We
see things arise (and so we must reject the extreme of complete nonexistence) and we
see things cease (and so we must reject the extreme of eternal existence). Thus, selfexistence is not found by experiences or by the intellectual examination of things: when
we analyze a car, we find no “essence”—no “car-ness”—but only parts that in turn are
also empty of “essences.” 2 So too, more generally: when we analyze any of our
experiences and any object that we experience, we find only impermanent, conditioned
phenomena. Hence, self-existence is not established (siddha). This means that nothing
exists by self-existence. In sum, we must conclude from experience that everything is
empty (śunya) of self-existence (niḥsvabhāva) and thus nothing is actually real in the
specified sense. No positive argument is needed to establish emptiness (śunyatā)—it is
simply the automatic consequence of self-existence not being established. That is, the
emptiness of things follows by default and thus does need its own supporting argument.
Thus, Nāgārjuna sees a “middle path” (madhyama) between “exist” (asti, sat), i.e.,
“real” in the sense of being eternal and unchanging—and total nonexistence (nāsti,
asat) like, to use the Indian examples, a son of a barren woman or the horns of a rabbit.3
All that there actually is is the “that-ness” (tattva) of the phenomenal realm—a world
void of anything self-contained. The enlightened can still use conceptualizations to
facilitate their way in the phenomenal world, but the unenlightened make the mistake
of subconsciously projecting (prapañca) our concepts onto what is actually there and
thinking that reality is make up of a multitude of self-contained parts. But because
things are not “real” but empty of any unchanging inherent existence, the Buddhist path
to end suffering can work.4
However, Nāgārjuna’s project has an interesting consequence: since self-existence
is not established, there are not real (sat) things, and thus it follows that there are no
2

Nāgārjuna writes that nothing is found or seen (vidyate) rather than nothing exists. But I will follow the
contemporary convention and use “exists.”
3
This goes back to the Discourse to Kātyāyana/Kaccayana of the P~li canon (Saṃyutta Nikāya II.215):
the world of attachment relies on the duality of “Everything exists (atthita)” and “Everything does not
exist (na atthita).” The Buddha teaches the “right view” (sammādiṭṭhi) of the “middle path” that avoids
these extremes. When one sees the cessation of phenomena correctly, the extreme of the permanence
and eternalness of existence is avoided; when one sees the arising of things correctly, the extreme of
nonexistence is avoided. The text then presents the steps of dependent-arising. This is the only Buddhist
text that Nāgārjuna cites (MK 15.7).
4
Nāgārjuna never presents this argument in the abstract. Rather, his principal text—the Fundamental
Verses of the Middle Way—addresses individual topics (e.g., time, action, suffering, the fundamental
components of reality [dharmas], and a person) and shows how they cannot work if they were in fact
real (i.e., self-existent and thus eternal and immutable).
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realities to arise, change, or cease. So too, causation is not possible without real entities
(bhāvas) to be a cause or effected (nor for Nāgārjuna is causation possible between
self-existent entities). Thus, dependently-arisen “entities” are not real entities and do
not arise (YS 19, 48). So too, “the nature of all things (dharmatā) is, like nirvāṇa,
unarisen and unceased” (MK 18.7) since there are no self-existent entities to arise or
cease. Nor are there real referents in the world for our words. Indeed, since words too
are not real, the Buddha did not teach any real doctrine (MK 25.24, SS 69). Nāgārjuna’s
Overturning the Objections shows how difficult it was for him to convince his
opponents (there, proponents of the Hindu Nyāya school) that something could work
or even exist if it was not self-existent. He sees his opponents as accepting that nothing
exists except through self-existence, and thus seeing something as existing but not selfcontained was inconceivable for them. That is, he sees his opponent claiming that only
self-existent entities are being real (sat) and capable of doing anything. To them, if
something is empty of self-existence, it is totally nonexistent (asat, nāsti) and
powerless to achieve anything. Thus, they saw Nāgārjuna as actually having to be
committed to self-existent entities just to make any arguments or he was an ontological
nihilism despite his claim of a “middle way” that rejects nonexistence. Some
commentators in the West today also argue that he was logically committed to
ontological nihilism. The purpose of this article is to examine that claim.
1. WHAT IS “ONTOLOGICAL NIHILISM”?
The first thing to clarify is what exactly his detractors mean by “ontological nihilism”
since it is so counter-intuitive—isn’t is obvious that at least something exists, and so
isn=t literal nihilism impossible to maintain? Isn’t the statement “The ultimate truth is
that nothing exists” both, as Jan Westerhoff says (2016, 337), “obviously empirically
false . . . and straightforwardly inconsistent”? Even without some “ultimate reality,”
there still are appearances, and don’t they have some reality? Nihilism cannot mean
simply that something ceases or is destroyed (uccheda) since that thing would have had
to exist in some way prior to that event—that is not like the son of a barren woman.5
Today in the West there are philosophers such as Daniel Dennett (1991) who believe
that the self or consciousness is a groundless illusion: they do not reduce conscious
phenomena to material phenomena but eliminate the phenomena themselves altogether
by declaring that there is nothing there. 6 Wilfrid Sellars (1997, 83) is not alone in
claiming that in light of science “the common sense world of physical objects in Space
5

Thus, uccheda does not refer to an eliminationism in the contemporary Western sense in which the
alleged reality never existed in the first place. Nāgārjuna connects annihilation (uccheda) with
nonexistence (nāsti) (MK 15.8-11): whatever is destroyed could not have been self-existent (since what
is real is eternal and unchanging) and thus is not real. It is not as if something that had been real came to
not exist. In sum, for Nāgārjuna if something is annihilated, it is not real and thus it was nonexistent all
along.
6
See Jones 2013, 11-12 for the distinction of reductionism and eliminationism.
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and Time is unreal—that is, there are no such things.” Indeed, an illusion could be
totally nonexistent—when a rope is misperceived as a snake, the snake has no existence
whatsoever.7 But as Advaita Vedāntins would later argue, we dismiss the reality of
something only in relation to the reality of something else (here, the rope).
Classical Indian and contemporary commentators who advocate a nihilistic
interpretation of Nāgārjuna do not claim that he propounds the extreme of nonexistence
(which would go against what he explicitly states) but rather that his position logically
entails ontological nihilism. However, they do not have one uniform view of what
“ontological nihilism” is.8 The extreme position is that without self-existent realities
(i.e., things existing through svabhāva), everything is an illusion—there are no external
objects in any sense or any basic components of experience (dharmas). The
Buddhologist Louis de la Vallée Poussin expounded such a position: in rejecting the
ultimate reality of dharmas, Mādhyamikas completely reject the existence of anything
whatsoever—entities (bhāvas) are like the child of a barren woman—and thus the
object described, the description itself, and the person doing the describing are all
totally nonexistent (quoted in Westerhoff 2016, 352). Without some reality as a
foundation, even illusions could not exist, and Nāgārjuna maintains that emptiness
(śunyatā) is not a reality of any kind—not some absolute cosmic Void or vacuous
ontological abyss out of which all phenomena emerge—but only the designation of the
lack of self-existence in things (MK 13.8, 24.18). Thus, nothing exists on the
conventional level (vyavahāram) or on the ultimate ontological level (paramārthasatya), and so nothing is real in any sense—the ultimate nature of reality is that there
is an absolute nothingness. In the words of Jan Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna’s “arguments
set out to show that the idea of a theory that represents the nature of reality at the
ultimate level is a chimera” (2017, 104). In sum, in the extreme nihilistic position
nothing grounds either conventional truths or ultimate truths, and thus from the point
of view of the ultimate ontological status of things nothing exists.
The most sustained defenses of Madhyamaka nihilism are by Thomas Wood
(1994) and David Burton (1999, 2001). Both argue that the logical implication of
Nāgārjuna’s arguments is extreme nihilism, even though according to Burton
Nāgārjuna did not realize it. According to Wood (1994, 280), Nāgārjuna describes
reality in terms of the “sheer, unqualified, absolute nothingness” of a son of a barren
woman or the horn of a rabbit. According to Burton (1999, 4, 113-114), since all entities
7

The rope/snake analogy is associated with Advaita Vedānta, but it may have been introduced by the
Mādhyamikas, depending on the age of a certain text (see Jones 2011, 5-8). For Śaṃkara, one can deny
the existence of an alleged reality only by appeal to another reality (Brahmasūtrabhāṣya III.2.22). He
also tries to explain how something could appear even though it did not exist by employing the analogy
to a person with an eye-defect who sees two moons when there is only one (Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
IV.1.15). The Buddhist Yogācārins also faulted Nāgārjuna in that way: an appearance only is possible if
there is an underlying reality (tattva) (see Ferraro 2017, 76-78)—the “such-ness” (tathatā) of the
dharmas remains.
8
See Westerhoff 2016, 341-61 for various classical Indian and modern nihilistic Western positions.
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lack svabhāva, they have merely a mind-dependent constructed existence
(prajñaptisat) and so are ontologically nonexistent—eveything, including a person, are
reduced to mere concepts and thus do not exist even conventionally. All things are mere
mental fabrications and names only (Burton 2001, 179). Equally important, there is
nothing unconstructed—no ontological foundation—out of which or by which entities
can be constructed conceptually (Burton 1999: 4). Instead, all aspects of entities are
conceptually constructed (ibid., 5). Thus, every object of thought and speech is utterly
nonexistent. Appearances are empty and so there is nothing real behind them; indeed,
even to call them “appearances” is misleading since they are totally nonexistent (asat)
(ibid., 9, 269). Thus, Mādhyamikas do not really believe in the existence of the
phenomenal world or any non-phenomenal absolute (ibid., 279).
I will proceed with the extreme interpretation of nihilism for this discussion:
nothing exists, either conventionally or ultimately—there is no reality behind the unreal
appearances. As Giuseppe Ferraro (2017, 94) says, the most consistent conclusion for
a nihilist is that Nāgārjuna is describing “ultimate reality” in terms of emptiness,
absence, and nothingness. Things that we take to be either ultimately or merely
conventionally real are like the snake in the rope/snake analogy or like the child of a
barren woman—things that have no reality whatsoever.
2.

SVABHĀVA AND ŚUNYATĀ

For Nāgārjuna, svabhāva is whatever would give something the power to exist and to
have the properties it has.9 Something “existing by its own inherent nature” is in no
way produced by causes and conditions but exists independently of all causes and
conditions (MK 24.16, VVV 22). Nor is it derived from something else that is real (MK
15.1-2).10 An entity existing through svabhāva is absolutely independent of all causes
and conditions and thus exists by its own power: its nature and existence are due only
to itself. In Tibetan Buddhism, it is characterized as what “exists from its own side.” It
is not created by, or be dependent upon, any other reality (MK 1.1). What exists by its
9

The Abhidharmists= multiplying dharmas may have been the provocation that caused Nāgārjuna’s
reaction, but he may be going further back to a more basic concept of “dharma” rather than responding
specifically and only to the Abhidharmists’ conception itself. Thus, he may not have been
mischaracterizing the Abhidharmists’ notion of “dharma,” as is often alleged, but going for a broader
conception. In any case, Abhidharmists did not respond to Nāgārjuna’s attack (or to any Mahāyāna
arguments).
10
Nāgārjuna does mention the possibility of “other-existence” (para-bhāva) (MK 15.3). Other-existence
for him is simply the self-existence of something else. Thus, if there is no self-existence, there can be no
other-existence (MK 1.3, 15.3, 22.9). So too, something could not be dependent on the self-existence of
something else and be itself real (i.e., self-existent). Thus, other-existence cannot be the source of another
self-existent reality (MK 15.1-2, 22.2, 24.9) since nothing can be the source of anything self-existent.
Other-existence is different from “otherwise-existence” (anyathābhāva), which would be a change in an
existent with svabhāva, which is impossible (MK 13.6) since what exists by self-existence cannot
change.

Comparative Philosophy 11.1 (2020)

JONES

8

own svabhāva has being (sat) and cannot be created (MK 24.33) or otherwise come
into existence (MK 24.22-23) or cease to exist or be eliminated (MK 22.24, VV 67) or
be affected by any action (MK 24.33). What is self-existent cannot change (MK 15.8).
Such things have an internal core that is isolated from other things. The only possible
relationships between things existing by svabhāva are complete identity and complete
disconnection (e.g., MK 2.21, 6.5, 18.10; VV 21).
The implication of such independence is that, however counterintuitive it may
seem, what exists by svabhāva must be self-existent (since nothing could create it) and
be eternal (since destruction, even by its own accord, would be a change in its being).
All things that exist through self-existence would be permanent (eternal) because they
would have no cause and what is without a cause is permanent (VV 55). For Nāgārjuna,
having an unchanging “intrinsic nature” has the same effect. It is the source of its own
“essence” and is self-maintaining. Such a power would also make each entity (bhāva)
exist distinct from all other entities—no self-existent thing could be in any way
dependent upon any other thing. Thus, it would be self-contained. The two dimensions
of having its own unchanging nature and existing independently of all causes and
conditions are not clearly distinguished in Nāgārjuna’s works. He never discussed
svabhāva in the abstract, but in discussing different types of alleged realities, he utilized
one aspect in some places and the other in other places. But since in his use of the term
“svabhāva” one aspect implicates the other, that is a legitimate strategy.
No English term captures the two aspects of svabhāva. Translators render it
variously as “self-existing,” “self-being,” “self-causing,” “self-generating,” “an
existent (bhāva) by itself (sva),” “own-entity,” “own-being,” “own-becoming,” “ownsource,” “own-cause,” “own-nature,” “inherent nature,” “intrinsic nature,” “essential
nature,” “essence,” “innate,” “substance,” or “inherent being.” Nāgārjuna uses the word
in both the sense of self-existence and own-nature, and so it can be translated here as
“self-existence” or “self-nature” depending on the context. It also will be characterized
as “self-contained.” In addition, “svabhāva” sometimes means simply “by its own
nature” in a non-philosophical sense, just as Nāgārjuna uses “ātman” (MK 10.15,
22.16, 27.4) without a commitment to a metaphysics of an eternal, unchanging self.
Aristotle’s concept of “substance” as an essence is the closest in Western
philosophy to Nāgārjuna’s idea. Substance is what remains when all experienced,
changing properties are removed. (It should be noted that modern empiricists question
the very notion of “substance”—in John Locke’s phrase, a “something we know not
what.”) But “svabhāva” denotes both self-existence and some unchanging nature—it
is not a featureless reality distinct from all properties or attributes that sustains those
properties. Nor should it be confused with matter: Buddhists have concepts for
substance (dravya) and the perceived material form (rūpa). Nor does what Nāgārjuna
intends involve mass or solidity. In modern philosophy, the closest is Leibniz’s idea of
simple “monads”: each monad is the source of its own powers and properties (but not
its own being) and all monads exist in a harmoniously working, coordinated universe
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(but Nāgārjuna does not have this latter idea).11 In short, unlike Western ontological
concepts svabhāva is a metaphysical power that gives a thing both its existence and its
characteristics.
For Nāgārjuna, self-existence is necessary for any thing of any type (bhāva or
dharma) to be real (sat): there is no reality (sat) of an entity without self-existence (MK
1.10). But no such self-existence is found in any conventional entity (bhāva) (VVV 1,
17, 20) or in any ultimate component of the experienced world (dharma). Nothing selfcontained is found when we examine any entity or dharma.12 A dharma that is not
dependently arisen is not found; thus, there is no dharma that is not empty (MK 24.19).
So too, for things empty of self-existence to be real, things that are self-existent must
first exist (so that there would be some reality that could become empty of selfexistence), but nothing whatsoever exists that is without self-existence, and therefore
what is empty of self-existence cannot be real (MK 13.7)—thus, there are no real
bhāvas or dharmas to arise or cease or to be empty. Thus, there is actually nothing to
deceive us (MK 13.2).
Nāgārjuna characterizes what is without self-existence as being empty (śunya).
This does not mean being empty of matter—it is a metaphysical emptiness of anything
that gives something the power to be, not a space empty of all material things. Nothing
is self-created or self-contained. In effect, it is an expansion of the Buddhist idea of noself (anātman) to all things. Hence, Nāgārjuna discusses the emptiness of a person (MK
18) just like any other phenomenon. There is no eternal, permanent “self” to a person
or anything corresponding to a “self” in other things that would give anything its own
self-contained existence. Any composite thing (a bhāva) cannot be self-existent since
it depends on its parts, but even the parts are dependent on causes and conditions and
thus are not self-existent. What arises from causes and conditions cannot be selfcontained in either its nature or existence—it has no intrinsic property or capacity to
exist. Something that does not exist by self-existence cannot be a cause (SS 12) since
it is not real (sat). But “emptiness” is not merely a negative conclusion: it indicates the
true nature of reality (tattva).
The noun “śunyatā” is the abstraction “emptiness,” but this does not make
emptiness into a metaphysical source, a transcendent absolute, or indeed any other type
of reality. (Nāgārjuna uses the adjective “śunya” more often than the noun “śunyatā”
11

“Svabhāva” is a feature all self-existent entities would share and thus is not itself a lakṣaṇa, i.e., the
defining “mark” of a phenomenon (e.g., the wetness of water and the heat of fire) that distinguishes one
phenomenon from other phenomena. Such marks are also not real (self-existent) entities (MK 5.3-5).
But svabhāva could be treated as a necessary part of the nature of each self-contained thing’s own unique
lakṣaṇa. (Whether “being” is a property became an issue in Western philosophy concerning whether
Anselm’s ontological argument is valid.) if so, emptiness would be a global lakṣaṇa—part of the defining
nature of each impermanent phenomenon.
12
The absence of a bhava—an abhāva—is possible as a reality only if a bhāva is real (sat), and since
bhāvas are not real, neither can there be any real abhāvas (e.g., MK 15.4-5, 25.7). The two terms are
also conceptually tied together and so are not independently real in Nāgārjuna’s way of thinking (see
Jones 2014, 174-77).
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in the Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way.) That is, emptiness is not an “essence”
by which things exist. It is not a new special ontological power. It is not a property of
things or any type of entity. Emptiness is not an ontological entity of any sort but only
the designation for the lack of self-existence. That is, the term is merely a dependent
designation (upādāya-prajñapti) of the true state of things (MK 24.18)—i.e., that
everything is empty of any power to make itself self-existent. The term “emptiness”
does not designate anything real (sat) but only the absence of anything real in the sense
of being self-existent. (There is no one abstract “Self-existence” but only the alleged
self-existence of different entities. So too, there is no one universal cosmic
“Emptiness.”) Emptiness itself is merely another construct and thus empty of selfexistence (MK 22.11, 24.18; VV 24). 13 The claim “All things are empty of selfexistence” is itself empty (as is that claim and this one). Anyone who reifies emptiness
and thereby makes it into a cosmic Void or a new ontological “essence” giving things
reality or a type of entity or a reality similar in any way to svabhāva is simply incurable
(asādhyān) (MK 13.8)—they are hopelessly attached to seeing the world in terms of
self-existent entities.
Thus, the true state of things is that everything is essenceless in both their existence
and nature—all things are contingent, impermanent, changing, and dependent upon
other things. What is conditioned is not one or many, being (sat), or nonbeing (asat)
(SS 32). From the point of view of reality (tattva), there is no being or nonbeing (SS 1)
since both sat and the lack thereof would be properties only of entities.
3. TATTVA: THE FORGOTTEN CONCEPT
One relevant concept is omitted in most discussions of Madhyamaka nihilism: tattva.
The term “tattva” designates the sheer “that-ness” (tat-tva) of things (MK 15.6, 18.9,
24.9).14 “Yathā-bhūtaṃ” (RV 28) and “dharmatā” (MK 18.7) also convey the idea of
the true nature of things. Tattva is not a transcendent reality that is the source of the
phenomenal world, or an unexperiencable Kantian noumenon, but is simply the
phenomenal world as it really is—empty of any distinct svabhāva-existing objects
(bhāvas or dharmas). From the point of view of reality (tattvatas), there is no existence
(asti) or nonexistence (nāsti) of the entire cosmos (RV 38). Nor is tattva a self-existent
entity or the lack of one—only objects are described as lacking self-existence and being
13

Thus, the “emptiness of emptiness” is not some mysterious claim: it merely indicates that Nāgārjuna
is treating “emptiness” like any other concept—a dependent designation (see Jones 2018a, 59-61). It is
empty in the same way that all conceptualizations are: it arises only dependently. The “emptiness of
emptiness” has become a major theme only in contemporary accounts of Madhyamaka thought.
14
In MK 15.6, “tattva,” like “satya,” means both truth and reality: “Those who perceive self-existence,
other-existence, an entity, and a non-entity do not perceive the truth/reality (tattva) in the Buddha’s
teaching.” “Tattvatas” in MK 17.26 and 23.2 means “from the point of view of reality.” Siderits and
Garfield (2013, 662) take these two verses to be Nāgārjuna’s opponent speaking, but even if so, this does
not change Nāgārjuna’s acceptance of tattva.
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dependently-arisen, not tattva. Thus, is-ness (astitā) is not a synonym for tattva—we
must pass beyond “is-ness” and “is-not-ness” (RV 61) to see what is truly real.
Because his soteriological objective is to end attachments, Nāgārjuna need not say
much about tattva—i.e., what is left over once the objects that are the objects of our
desires and grasping are ended. (So too, nirvāṇa is not a self-existent entity [MK 25.216]. Nor for Nāgārjuna is nirvāṇa a name for tattva.) Only one verse depicts tattva. The
passage reads:
[9] The characteristic of what is actually real is this: not dependent upon another, peaceful,
free of being projected upon by conceptual projections (prapañcair aprapañcitam), free of
thoughts (vikalpas), and without multiplicity. [10] Whatever arises dependent upon another
thing is not that thing, nor is it different from that thing. Therefore, it is neither annihilated
nor eternal. [11] Not one, not diverse, not annihilated, not eternalCthis is the immortal
teaching of the buddhas, the guides of the world (MK 18.9-11).

Tattva is free of any discrete parts that we normally cut the world up into by our
thoughts (vikalpas) that necessarily make distinctions—it does not have the artificial
borders within it that our conceptual differentiations suggest. Nāgārjuna does not give
any positive substantive characterizations of reality as it truly is.15 Rather, he focuses
on denying that objects are self-existent. He equates emptiness with the Buddhist
metaphysics of impermanence and dependent-arising (pratītyasamutpāda) (MK 24.18,
SS 68), but tattva is not equivalent of śunyatā: śunyatā is not a reality of an kind but
merely a conceptual designation of the lack of self-existence to things.16 So too, tattva
is not a higher level emptiness but only the state of phenomenal reality.
Tattva thus is simply the phenomenal realm free of our conceptual division of it
into self-contained objects (bhāvas and dharmas) and is open to direct experience. It is
not some hidden or transcendent reality. Nāgārjuna does not reject sense-experience of
the phenomenal world as cognitive—he wants to correct our experience
of the world and to see what is really there rather than our conceptual projections.
Seeing tattva is not seeing something behind the phenomenal realm but seeing the
phenomenal realm as it is without our conceptual overlay.17 Those who see reality
15

Since Nāgārjuna does not give any positive ontology of tattva’s properties, he is antimetaphysical in
that sense (see Ferraro 2013), but he does accept and discuss tattva and thus is metaphysical in that sense.
Thereby, he also is affirming the existence of a reality (without arguing for its existence) against the
claim of nihilism.
16
What Tola and Dragonetti (1995) say about emptiness may more properly be said of tattva.
17
To get a sense of this, think of a Gestalt figure such as the faces/goblet: the black and white colors are
reality as it truly is (tattva), but we impose structure on them, thereby creating illusory faces or a goblet
and then treat them as distinct objects (prapañca). The faces or goblet do not really exist, but the colored
material does. That Nāgārjuna still wrote indicates that the enlightened still had conceptualizations
operating in their mind even though they do not see the phenomenal realm cut up into distinct segments
following those conceptualizations. On the issue of the relation of conceptualizations and experiences,
see Jones 2020.

Comparative Philosophy 11.1 (2020)

JONES

12

(tattva-darśana) do not see objects to desire and thus do not form the dispositions
underlying the actions that propel the cycling of rebirth (MK 26.10) and thus are
liberated from the karmic forces driving rebirth. Bhāvas and dharmas can still be
parceled out by our concepts for practical purposes—it is only as discrete selfcontained objects that they are illusory.
This brings up the role of conceptions in unenlightened experiences. Conceptions
per se are not the problem—after all, the Buddha, the best among knowers of tattva (SS
48), spoke, and that activity necessarily makes distinctions. Even if one wanted to argue
that the Buddha was not in an enlightened state of consciousness when he taught—
something few Buddhists would accept—still the fact that he spoke at all meant that
the enlightened could accept the use of language. The problem is the projection of our
concepts onto reality and then distorting what is truly there by seeing it as a set of
distinct self-contained objects—prapañca.
Prapañca is projecting onto what is truly real (tattva) the conceptual
differentiations we ourselves devise, and thereby seeing reality as a collection of
discrete objects. Its importance to Nāgārjuna is indicated by the fact that it, not
emptiness, is mentioned in the dedicatory verse of the Fundamental Verses of the
Middle Way along with dependent-arising. Translators have rendered the term “projection of plurality,” “conceptual construction,” “hypostatization,” “objectification,”
“reification,” “proliferation,” and “superimposition.” It makes our subjective mental
discriminations into features of reality. 18 In this way, we create a false world of
differentiated, isolated objects corresponding to our conceptual creations. The nature
of the entire conventional world is born from prapañca (RV 50): through prapañca,
we misuse our concepts to carve up tattva into distinct parts and end up focusing on the
partness and not tattva. We mistakenly reify names and concepts into distinct referents,
but since names and concepts can refer only to things that are discrete and selfcontained, no words apply to reality as it truly is. There are no real objects in tattva,
but prapañca creates a proliferation of illusory distinct objects that we take to be
existing independently of each other. Thus, we should abandon the fabrications of “is”
and “is not” (MK 9.12).
But tattva is not a collection of independent bhāvas or dharmas or itself a bhāva or
dharma—it is “pacified” (śanta, MK 7.16, 18.9, 22.12, 23.15, VV29) since it is undis18

Mark Siderits equates prapañca with all conceptualizationCactually, he says “[s]uppose we take
prapañca to mean conceptualisation” (2019, 645-646, italics added). He takes Nāgārjuna’s objective to
be the cessation of all conceptualization, and he realizes that the claim “all conceptionalization falsifies”
leads to the paradox that its truth would entail its falsity (ibid., 646), but he gladly accepts that his
semantic interpretation leads there. But again, the Buddha spoke and others write (including Nāgārjuna)
and so not all conceptualization is rejected, only the projection of those conceptualizations onto tattva
and the discrimination (vikalpa) of distinct objects. As noted below, the enlightenment experience is not
a matter of accepting some statement (which must be a product of conceptualization) and thus does go
beyond any conceptualization, but in the enlightened state one can speak and write—one can see the true
nature of things without a complete cessation of conceptualization, but prapañca ceases.
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turbed by our projection of concepts into a set of clashing independent parts. Indeed,
tattva is free of conceptualizations—the distinct objects that our concepts produce are
merely our creations. The stilling of all conceptual support and the stilling of the projection of concepts onto reality is peace (śivaḥ) (MK 25.24). No concepts developed for
the discussion of bhāvas or dharmas could apply because tattva is not divided up into
parts for our concepts about entities to correspond to. Since tattva is not an entity or
collection of entities, there is nothing within it to be an alleged referent and thus it
cannot be expressed in terms of the attributes of entities but only more abstractly (as in
MK 18.9-10).
In effect, we see independent objects in the real world mirroring our concepts. This
is seeing our concepts as instantiated in the real world. Thereby, we create the
conventional world. But conceptions of independent entities never converge with
reality as it really is. This includes even the distinction between experiencer and what
is experienced (since neither are changeless, self-contained entities). The very discrimination (vikalpa) of distinct entities is the result of projecting our conceptual distinctions
onto reality (MK 18.5). In short, we superimpose “self-existence” onto what is void of
it. We thereby distort reality by seeing it as a mass of unconnected entities
corresponding to the discrete concepts that our mind has devised. Such discriminations
cause karmic acts and the resulting afflictions (MK 18.5). To be enlightened is to “still”
the mind of this projection, not to be free of perceptions and concepts per se. Thus, the
enlightened need not do away with sense-perceptions or concepts—they now perceive
the phenomenal world as it is (tattva) free of self-contained entities, and they can still
use whatever concepts that their culture uses to navigate in the perceived world and to
teach others, but they do not project the categories that they are using onto the world
(MK 22.15) and thus do not discriminate illusory entities. Thereby, the enlightened
preserve both the language of conventional life and seeing reality as it truly is.
The concept “tattva” deserves a prominent place in discussions of nihilism, but it
is barely noticed by the disputants. The one exception is Giuseppe Ferraro (2013, 2014,
2017), although he does not give tattva its central importance in Nāgārjuna’s scheme
of things. According to Ferraro (2014, 452), Nāgārjuna is a realist since he admits the
existence of a reality (tattva, paramārtha) that exists independent of at least the
ordinary workings of the mind and that cannot be described or verbalized. David
Burton (2001, 183-185) appears open to the possibility of Nāgārjuna affirming an
indescribable “unconditioned reality” and affirming that the world is not entirely a
mental fabrication, but he does not see tattva in those terms. In responding to Ferraro,
Jay Garfield and Mark Siderits (2013, 662-663) cannot see tattva or dharmatā as
evidence that Nāgārjuna posits an “inexpressible ultimate”; rather, they explain away
the passages as at most being about dharmas. However, tattva is Nāgārjuna’s
designation of phenomenal reality as it truly is once we remove our projection of
conceptualized entities onto it—it is what is experienced once the perception of selfcontained entities is ended.
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4. NĀGĀRJUNA IS NOT AN ONTOLOGICAL NIHILIST
From the above discussion, it should be clear that Nāgārjuna was not an ontological
nihilist: he affirmed a reality (tattva) even though the bhāvas and dharmas that we
carve out of it are not distinct real (sat) entities. Tattva is not an entity and thus cannot
be properly described as self-existent (svabhāva) or as a real entity. Thus, Nāgārjuna
never connected svabhāva with tattva in any of his works but only with bhāvas and
dharmas (e.g., MK 24.16, 24.22-23, 24.33; VVV 22). Thereby, he can affirm a reality
while denying distinct real parts: he eliminates bhāvas and dharmas as self-existent,
and since they are empty of svabhāva they are nonexistent.19 In sum, things in the
phenomenal world are not isolated, real entities, and their parts in turn are empty of any
self-existence, and so on all the way down. Everything is dependently-arisen. But
Nāgārjuna also affirms an undifferentiated reality behind our conceptions—an
ontological substratum that is not conceptually constructed. (So too, there must be some
reality that does the conceptual construction.) Thus, he is not a nihilist with regard to
all of reality.20
For this position to hold, Nāgārjuna must, as he claims, affirm a “middle path”
between the permanence and eternalism (asti) of entities and their complete
nonexistence (nāsti): “Whatever is dependently arisen, we call ‘emptiness.’ Once
comprehended, this indicator is in fact itself the ‘middle way’ between eternalism and
annihilationism” (MK 24.18).21 That nothing self-exists does not mean that nothing
exists in any sense. He is affirming a mode of existence unrelated to svabhāva—an
existence empty of svabhāva. This emptiness does not reach the extreme of the total
nonexistence of the snake in the rope/snake analogy or the child of a barren woman—
empty phenomena are really there. While in Nagarjunian metaphysics it would be false
to say “Entity x exists, but it lacks self-existence” or “Entity x is real, but it does not
exist by self-existence,” this does not apply to tattva since tattva is not a self-contained
entity or otherwise a conceptualized entity. But tattva still exists in a non-svabhāva
sense. How to state that is not easy since in effect Nāgārjuna has made terms related to
existence and reality—“real,” “exists,” “is”—terms of art: they involve self-existence,
and so anything that does not involve self-existence is not real and does not exist in
Nāgārjuna’s terminology. But he uses the self-existent mode of existence only with
19

Is Nāgārjuna therefore a “realist”? There are varieties of realisms. He is a realist in the sense of
affirming a reality independent of our mental conceptions (tattva), although reality is not cut up into the
objects we conceptualize and thus he is not a realist with regard to discrete objects (dharmas or bhāvas).
He sees his opponents as realists with regard to objects. He also rejects any real referents to our concepts.
Thus, he would have to reject any correspondence theory of truth for claims from the ultimate point of
view without rejecting language, and thus he is not a realist with regard to any realities possibly
corresponding to our conceptualizations.
20
Jay Garfield (2014) argues the opposite: Nāgārjuna is not a nihilist but a “robust realist” because for
him entities (bhāvas) exist conventionally.
21
Garfield (2014, 50) agrees that Nāgārjuna affirms another way of existing besides svabhāva (being
empty), but he does not see this in terms of tattva.
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regard to bhāvas and dharmas, not with regard to tattva. Nāgārjuna never applies “real”
or “exists” to tattva. Thus, we must distinguish “real” or “exists” in his restricted sense
of self-existence from “real” or “exists” as a broader category: something can be nonsvabhāva and still be real and exist in the latter way. In this way, Nāgārjuna can deny
anything exists through svabhāva and still affirm that it exists in another manner—and
that is what tattva does. Thus, that everything is free of svabhāva and therefore
impermanent does not mean that nothing exists at all. He can also explain why there
are appearances of entities while the extreme nihilists cannot.
Thus, Nāgārjuna is not saying that bhāvas and dharmas do not exist but only that
they do not exist as he believes that we normally take them to exist—i.e., through selfexistence. It is only that they are self-contained rather than the products of causes and
conditions that is rejected. That is, the existence of bhāvas and dharmas is not disputed,
only their mode of existence: they exist, but they are dependently-arisen and thus are
empty of independent self-existence. There is something to a “self” and other things
that enables them to work, even if their entity-ness is no more than our conception.
Thus, bhāvas and dharmas are not real in the restricted sense of svabhavā but
nonetheless do exist:
Those who understand the nature of entities see that entities are impermanent, deceptive in
nature, hollow, empty (śunya), selfless (anātman), clear (vivikta), without a locus or
objective support in the world, rootless, with no fixed abode, totally arisen from rootignorance (avidyā), utterly bereft of beginning, middle and end, without a core, like the
banana tree trunk (which is hollow at its core), like the castle of the Gandharvas in the sky,
like an illusionCthus, this whole dreadful world appears (YS 25-27).22

Entities have the status of dreams or magical illusions—i.e., dependent on other things,
arising from other things, and without any self-existent substance. Bhāvas and dharmas
are in the same boat as being conditioned and arising and falling dependently, but
dharmas are still more fundamental in Nāgārjuna’s ontology than composite bhāvas.
Dharmas do not become conventional entities even though they too are conventionally
designated.
As discussed, tattva is not the sum of all bhāvas and dharmas since they are based
on our conceptions—there are no self-existent entities but rather a “pacified” reality
free of self-contained parts. Nor does Nāgārjuna argue for an interconnected whole but
only for the “that-ness” of conditioned parts. Tattva is not made by cobbling together
22

Like the Prajñāpāramitā texts, Nāgārjuna likens entities (bhāvas) to an illusion (māyā), a mirage, a
dream, an illusory phantasm, a reflection, a bubble, foam, a circle of light produced by spinning a torch
fast, and the imaginary castle in the sky of the Gandharvas (MK 7.34, 17.33, 23.8-9; SS 36, 40-42, 66).
All are meant to indicate that things are not independently real but are impermanent and dependent (like
a magic trick on a magician) and are also deceptive on the surface to the unenlightened—not that the
phenomena do not exist. Nor are the analogies meant to convey that some sense-experiences are veridical
but all hallucinatory.
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parts—to see tattva as composed of dharmas is still looking at the phenomenal realm
in the wrong way and misses the character of both tattva and the dharmas. We carve
out eddies in the swirling phenomena of the world according to the interests and needs
reflected in our conventions, but the resulting conceptualized entities are not real in the
svabhāva sense but only our conceptual fabrications. Nevertheless, the impermanent
parts have causal power: they can do work—indeed, Nāgārjuna argues in his
Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way and Overturning the Objections that only if
entities are not self-contained can they accomplish anything and that his empty words
can point out problems with self-existence and thus point out the emptiness of things.
To the extent that emptiness is used in opposition to self-existence, it is merely a case
of one illusory or dream reality putting an end to another illusory or dream reality (VV
23).
The fact that something eternal and immutable is no doubt real does not entail that
what is not permanent is totally nonexistent. Nor for Nāgārjuna does it follow from the
fact that nothing is self-existent (and thus not real in the restricted svabhāva sense) that
nothing exists in any sense. Nor must something be self-contained to be deemed real in
another sense. And Nāgārjuna specifies another mode of existence—dependent-arising.
Conceptualizing things is not itself the problem—prapañca is, i.e., reifying and
projecting our concepts onto reality (tattva) and seeing back a collection of selfcontained entities, thereby distorting our perceptions and thinking. Things that concepts
denote do not exist in the restricted sense, but the enlightened can use concepts to
indicate impermanent eddies in the phenomenal world without being misled. Tattva is
what is left when we remove the notion of conceptualized parts and thus is itself free
of conceptions, but this does not mean that the enlightened cannot legitimately discuss
at least a little of its nature by means of our conventional language.
5. PROBLEMS WITH NIHILISTIC INTERPRETATIONS
It is understandable that many commentators endorse a nihilistic interpretation of
Nāgārjuna’s metaphysics: Nāgārjuna gives his opponents all the verbs and adjectives
concerning existing or being real and ties all the terms to his restrictive sense of
svabhāva. Nihilists see him denying reality through svabhāva and conclude that he has
to deny reality period. Being a permanent, immutable entity is all that can be real (sat).
But they can do that only by endorsing self-contained individual existence as the only
mode of existence: with svabhāva as the only criterion for existence, tattva, like bhāvas
and dharmas, cannot be real since it is not a self-existent entity, and since the parts are
each unreal (asat), the totality of them (tattva) is also unreal. Thus, to describe reality
in terms of emptiness is ultimately to describe it in terms of nothingness even if
Nāgārjuna did not see this consequence. Nihilists end up seeing reality only in terms of
objects and svabhāva, and so the denial of self-existent bhāvas and dharmas is the total
negation of reality. Thus, the error that nihilists make is to conclude that reality (tattva)
is just a collection of bhāvas and dharmas and since these are not real in Nāgārjuna’s
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restricted sense, nothing else can be real in another mode of being—in short, no
fundamental real dharmas, no nothing. All things are just conceptual constructs (Burton
1999, 9), and there is nothing else. But tattva is not the totality of such entities, and, as
noted above, Nāgārjuna never discussed tattva in terms of self-existent entities. Tattva
is ontologically prior to the parts that we carve out with our concepts. In effect, we cut
entities out of tattva, but tattva is not made up by splicing together the parts that we
create.
A similar problem arises from the ambiguity of “svabhāva” as “intrinsic nature” or
“essence.” Again, there is Nāgārjuna’s restricted sense of “svabhāva” as existing by
something’s own nature and whose essence is eternal and immutable, and a broader
sense of a “nature” of a phenomenon that continues as long as the phenomenon happens
to exist but is not connected to its mode of existence. Something can have a
characteristic or property that only ends when the phenomenon ends without having
the metaphysical baggage of the claim that since the phenomenon has this trait that it
must exist forever and be unaffectable. Tattva has an “ultimate nature” in the broad
sense even though it is not a self-existent entity.
However, many commentators do not distinguish the two senses of “essence” and
create paradoxes. For example, Jay Garfield (2014, 52) sees a fundamental
contradiction: “emptiness is the intrinsic nature of anything that exists; hence the
intrinsic nature of things is to lack intrinsic nature.” That is, “Things have no svabhāva,
and that is their svabhāva.” That would indeed be a paradox. However, Nāgārjuna
never said that. The situation for him can be stated without paradox: “Things are empty
of self-existence (svabhāva), and that is their general ontological nature.” The
reasoning implicit in Garfield’s line of thought must be that (1) Nāgārjuna defines
svabhāva as being of a specific type of “nature” (one to which he adds that entities selfexist by that nature), (2) Nāgārjuna denies that anything has svabhāva, and therefore
(3) Nāgārjuna is actually denying all types of nature (whether an entity is self-existent
or not). Obviously, that conclusion does not logically follow: something can be empty
of specific type of “nature” without being empty of another type.
The term “nature” need not be highjacked to mean only an “intrinsic nature” of
Nāgārjuna’s svabhāva type. Something can be empty of anything making it selfcontained, and we can call this its “nature” or “essence” without being committed to
the svabhāva metaphysics of permanent existence. But nihilists see Nāgārjuna as
committed to only one mode of being—only svabhāva entails existenceCand so they
see the lack of an “intrinsic nature” (in Nāgārjuna’s restricted sense) as leading to
nihilism: the lack of svabhāva’s second component as an unwavering nature also means
that entities cannot be eternal and thus are not real. So too, the self-nature of empty
things is that they must have no self-existence and so do not exist. Thus, the intrinsic
nature of the world is that there is nothing at all (see Westerhoff 2016, 338). However,
for Nāgārjuna, the mode of existence for entities is emptiness, and that is the ultimate
ontological nature of existing things.
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Another problem concerns whether Nāgārjuna advances a view (dṛṣṭi) (MK 13.3,
13.7-8), thesis (pratijñā) (VV 29, VVV59), or proposition (pakṣa) (RV 104; see MK
2.10 and YS 50). Nihilists see only one mode of existence and so see any metaphysical
position on the general nature of reality as a view and thus conclude with Nāgārjuna
that he had no view. But in his works, Nāgārjuna treated “views” as only those positions
based on the metaphysics of self-existence or total nonexistence (MK 13.3, 13.8, 15.10,
21.14, 24.21, 27.1-2, 27.13-14, 27.29-30; RV 43-46; YS 23, 43-54) or a reality
connected to svabhāva (SS 21). In short, all views assume existence through svabhāva
or the extreme of total nonexistence (see Jones 2014, 147-149, 2018a, 62-64; also see
Burton 2001, 183-184). Thus, for Nāgārjuna not every metaphysical position is a
technical view. In particular, emptiness indicates the metaphysics of tattva that results
when svabhāva metaphysics is refuted. This means that the doctrine of tattva is a
metaphysical position that lies outside of Nāgārjuna’s restricted sense of “views”
connected to self-existence since emptiness is the consequence of repudiating selfexistence.
Thus, Nāgārjuna is not rejecting all metaphysics—he speaks of tattva and the
nonexistence of bhāvas and dharmas. Thereby, he can consistently speak of
relinquishing all views (MK 13.8) and still be replacing all svabhāva-related
metaphysics with the tattva ontology. And he can still claim that anyone who treats
emptiness as a dṛṣṭi is incurable (MK 13.8). So too, getting rid of “views” in this
technical sense does not lead to nihilism but the “middle way” of emptiness. Nihilists,
however, are inadvertently treating emptiness as a dṛṣṭi when they dismiss all
metaphysics as views.
A related problem concerns the “four options” (catuṣ-koṭi) (MK 12.1, 18.8,
22.11-12, 25.15-18, 25.22-23, 27.13, 27.20; see RV 106, 115). Here Nāgārjuna rejects:
(1) A exists; (2) A does not exist; (3) A both exists and does not exist; (4) A neither
exists nor does not exist. Just as the key to Nāgārjuna’s stance on views relates to
svabhāva, so here the key is that Nāgārjuna is denying the hidden erroneous
presupposition of the four options: that things exist by svabhāva (see Jones 2014,160162, 2018a, 48-51; Siderits and Garfield 2013, 658; Ferraro 2014, 460).23 All he is
saying in the strongest way possible is that the subject to each option does not exist: if
we think any of the options may be correct, we are still thinking in terms of a svabhāva
metaphysics and not of the tattva metaphysics. Denying the existence of a self-existent
entity is as much a matter of svabhāva as affirming its existence: if we are thinking in
terms of “exists” or “does not exist,” we are on the wrong track since we are still tacitly
thinking in terms of the existence or nonexistence of self-existent “real” entities. Thus,
even the fourth option is a matter of thinking in terms of self-existent entities and so
23

The four options are affirmed in MK 18.8 as steps in the Buddha=s progressive teaching
(anuśāsanam), with “neither being unreal (atathyam) nor being real (tathyam)” as the highest doctrine.
“Tathyam” more literally means “being so” or “being such” and contrasts with what is false or deceptive
(mṛṣā). For Nāgārjuna, the fourth option corresponds to rejecting the extremes of “is not” (nāsti) and
“is” (asti).
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must be denied. But since nihilists see only one mode of existence, the rejection of the
four options is seen as a repudiation of all metaphysics, and so all ultimate truths are
denied or at best are unstatable (e.g., Garfield 2014). However, for Nāgārjuna the four
options in no way reject the possibility of another metaphysics based on another mode
of being: tattva with its dependently arisen content.
6. THE CONFUSION OF “ULTIMATE REALITY”
Contemporary nihilistic interpreters of Nāgārjuna also assert that entities would be
“ultimate realities” if they existed through svabhāva. But since there is no svabhāva
there are no ultimate entities. However, nihilists believe that for Nāgārjuna without an
unchanging source nothing can be real: there must be at least one non-empty entity to
ground impermanent phenomena or else all is unreal. Thus, since everything in
Nāgārjuna’s metaphysics is dependent-arisen without an independently existing selfexistent foothold, nothing ultimately exists or can be real for him—there is no ultimate
ground for the entities to stand on (see, e.g., Burton 1999, 109-111). If nothing exists
ultimately, then nothing (including appearances) can exist at all (Ferraro 2017, 92). But
that claim is wrong. First, an infinite regress of causes grounds each cause, as Bertrand
Russell argued in his famous debate with Frederick Copleston. The entire chain would
be left without an explanation (contra Russell), but each cause would have an
explanation and that is all that is needed for Nāgārjuna: indefinite chains of causes and
conditions need no further grounding for each empty phenomenon within them to exist.
Second, an infinite chain of dependent entities is not any less grounded than a reality
that is claimed to somehow be Aself-created” or “causeless” and just there (see Jones
2018b, chap. 5). Each alternative seems absurd to its opponents, but advocates of
svabhāva have the same basic problem of why their reality ultimately exists. Third,
Nāgārjuna does present a foundational reality—tattva. There need not be a transcendent
reality or some unchanging “absolute” to ground entities. Rather, the perpetually
impermanent phenomenal world can be the reality behind our erroneous projections.
Nāgārjuna is not paradoxically claiming that groundless appearances (bhāvas and
dharmas) are the “ultimate reality.”24
However, Nāgārjuna uses “svabhāva” only in connection with bhāvas and
dharmas—i.e., alleged entities of one sort or another—not tattva. Tattva is not a type
of entity that is an alternative to bhāvas and dharmas. Thus, there is no ultimate entities,
but there is an “ultimate reality” (tattva). Nevertheless, the idea of “ultimate reality”
introduces confusion into these discussions of nihilism. To exist by svabhāva means
for Nāgārjuna that something self-exists independently of all other things does not
depend on causes and conditions to exist and is indestructible, and thus it is an “ultimate
reality.” So too, anything “ultimately real” in the svabhāva sense must have an
24

Jan Westerhoff (2016, 356-357) also raises the defense of mutually supporting networks of dependent
relations. But I do not see Nāgārjuna arguing that rather than chains of causes and conditions.
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“intrinsic nature” (Siderits and Garfield 2013, 661). This leads nihilists to conclude that
since nothing exists by svabhāva, there is nothing “ultimately real”—the only way to
be ultimately real is to exist by svabhāva. So too, there is no “intrinsic nature” to reality,
since that property is part of svabhāva. According to Siderits and Garfield (2013, 657),
“the point of emptiness is to undermine the very idea of an ultimate reality with its
ultimate nature.”
But, since Nāgārjuna gives tattva another mode of existence than existing by
svabhāva, “ultimately real” can have two senses here: the restricted sense of being
eternal and unchanging by existing through svabhāva, and a broader sense of
Aultimately real”—being real in the final ontological analysis, i.e., real and not
reducible to something else. Something can be ultimately real in the second sense
without being ultimately real in the first sense. However, nihilists believe that.
Nāgārjuna can only mean the first, narrower sense: what is “ultimately real” must be
entities existing through svabhāva, and since nothing exists through svabhāva, there is
no ultimate reality in any sense and no foundation for other phenomena. According to
Jay Garfield (2014, 49), conventional existence is the only kind of existence that is
possible, and there is no “ultimate reality.” (Actually, with his proclivity for paradoxes,
he says both that to exist conventionally is to be empty of ultimate reality [2014, 49]
and that emptiness is the ultimate reality of things [2014, 50].) That is, if neither bhāvas
nor dharmas are ultimately real by existing through self-existence, then there is nothing
ultimately real in the final ontological analysis of things. So too, without an ultimate
reality as a foundation, there are no reducible conventional realities—we are left with
only unexplained appearances paradoxically having the status of the totally nonexistent
child of a barren woman.
Thus, the premise that “ultimate reality” is only possible through self-existence
makes nihilism seem correct—there are only empty things and nothing “ultimatel real,”
and so nihilism is its logical consequence. But nothing in Nāgārjuna’s corpus justifies
that premise. Nāgārjuna never questioned the reality of tattva. He can accept that no
things (bhāvas and dharmas) are ultimately real (since they do not exist by selfexistence) and still affirm tattva in the final analysis. (And he can affirm that bhāvas
and dharmas are conventionally real.) What is dependently arisen is the nature of
reality in the final analysis—it is the “ultimate reality” of the world that we experience
for him.
Nāgārjuna never used a Sanskrit equivalent of “ultimate reality,” although
“śunyatā”is sometimes translated so (e.g, Garfield 2014, 50, although he treats
emptiness as a conventional reality), as is “tattva” (e.g., Ruegg 2000, 109). But overall,
the concept is a Western insertion into the discussion and leads only to dealing with
issues that are not germane to understanding Nāgārjuna. The term only leads to
confusion when “ultimate reality” is restricted to existing through self-existence but
then used to mean that there is no “ultimate reality” in the broader sense of being real
in the final analysis. In addition, “ultimate reality” in the West has the connotations of
a separate unaffectable reality transcending the phenomenal realm or otherwise being
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an unchanging Absolute that is the source of other realities.25 It also leads theists and
others to think of God. Thus, using that term may introduce a misunderstanding of
Nāgārjuna since he never uses “tattva” or “śunyatā” in those senses but keeps reality
within the phenomenal realm. Tattva is simply the content of the phenomenal realm
seen properly as free of independently existing self-contained parts. It is a reality, but
calling tattva the “ultimate level” of reality is confusing since there is no other “level
of reality”—Nāgārjuna rejects conventional entities and the dharma components as
being unreal (asat) in the final analysis. But Nāgārjuna never treats tattva as the
ontological source of bhāvas and dharmas—as if empty objects were caused by tattva
or arise out of it. Tattva can be said to “absolute” in that it transcends all conceptions,
but that adjective would again introduce the idea of a source or a reality apart from the
flux of phenomenal reality, which does not fit Nāgārjuna’s metaphysics.
Ultimately, there is only the “that-ness” of the phenomenal world, not any more
foundational or fundamental reality.26 But given that status of tattva, it would also be
confusing to say that Nāgārjuna claims that there is no “absolute” or “ultimate reality.”
All in all, the term “ultimate reality” is too ill-defined to add clarity to the discussion.
Calling tattva (or dharmatā or paramārtha) real in the final ontological analysis is
sufficient: this conveys tattva’s status without any confusing Western overtones or
implicit connection to svabhāva.
7. DOES NĀGĀRJUNA REJECT ALL ONTOLOGIES?
As presented here, Nāgārjuna has an implicit ontology: the “that-ness” (tattva) of the
phenomenal world that remains after we stop projecting our conceptual divisions onto
it. The objects of our conventional world (including dharmas) are all empty of selfexistence and thus are not real (sat) in the final analysis, but the sheer being of the
phenomena still stands. Impermanent and dependently-arisen entities still “exist,” only
not as self-contained realities. That is an ontology. It affirms a distinction between
reality as normally misperceived and seeing reality as it truly is. It also the distinction
between two types of truths—truths about reality as conventionally conceived (saṃvṛtisatya) and those about reality as it truly is (paramārtha-satya). Nihilists, however,
25

T. R. V. Murti (1955) presented a popular account of Madhyamaka along the lines of an Advaita-like
“Absolute”—i.e., Nāgārjuna was only denying all doctrines about reality but was not denying the
positive reality that transcends the phenomenal realm. However, unlike Advaita’s Brahman, tattva is not
a reality transcending the phenomenal world, not conscious, and is open to sense-experience. Nor does
anything in any of Nāgārjuna’s works suggest any of the absolutes adopted by some other Mahāyāna
schools. Rather, what he says about tattva suggests only the early Buddhist and Prajñāpāramitā subject
of the nature of the phenomenal realm—as discussed, tattva is simply the phenomenal realm free of our
conceptual overlay. Fyodor Stcherbatsky (1965 [1927]) identified nirvāṇa and paramārtha-satya with
tattva and treated them all as an absolute Void that is also a fullness out of which things arise. Also see
Tola and Dragonetti 1995.
26

See Jay Westerhoff (2017) for a discussion of Nāgārjuna’s rejection of foundationalism.
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routinely claim that Nāgārjuna rejects all metaphysics: all metaphysics are views
(dṛṣṭis), and Nāgārjuna rejects them all—including emptiness—so that we will have no
mental objects to grasp and thus can become free of suffering.27 Therefore, the empty
ontology of nihilism, despite it being a metaphysics, is logically entailed by
Nāgārjuna’s position.
It is certainly true that Nāgārjuna does have that soteriological purpose: his is not a
disinterested philosophical project to describe reality but to show how enlightenment
is possible and how the Buddhist praxis can work—if nothing could change, how could
we end our current state of suffering? And it is also true that we have to remove all
conceptualizations from our mind to experience reality (tattva) as it is: emptiness shows
that there are no “real” selves or objects to crave or grasp. Tattva is “free of thoughts
(vikalpas)” that make distinctions (MK 18.9). “When the domain of thought has ceased,
then what can be named has ceased” (MK 18.7). Thereby, the mind is calmed, and we
can see reality as it truly is. An enlightenment-experience would transcend our normal
way of looking at reality, and it would go beyond any linguistic event. To use an earlier
Buddhist analogy: enlightenment is not the intellectual acceptance of the idea “Water
quenches thirst” but actually drinking water (Saṃyutta Nikāya II.115). Quenching our
thirst by drinking water is not a linguistic event—it thus goes beyond what is expressed,
and so the realization is ineffable in that way. But this does not render the statable claim
“Water quenches thirst” in any way untrue. Once we have drunk water, we know what
it is like to drink water and thus now know the claim in a way that we did not when
relying on the testimony of others. That may change how one views water and
understands the claim, but the stated truth remains the same.
So too with enlightenment: realizing the emptiness of things and the resulting
direct, unmediated seeing of tattva (tattva-darśana, MK 26.10, SS 39) may initially
require a state of consciousness in which our linguistic abilities are temporarily in
abeyance. One then sees reality properly, i.e., free of entities existing by svabhāva,
concepts (vikalpas), and conceptual proliferation (prapañca). Not merely conception
projection (prapañca) is abeyance but all conceptions. The stilling of all conceptual
support and the stilling of the projection of concepts onto reality is “peace” (śivaḥ) (MK
25.24). However, even though the event of realizing the final truth is “beyond
language” and “ineffable,” stating the final truth after the experiential realization of it
may still be possible—those whose awareness (buddhi) has gone beyond “It is” (asti)
and “It is not” (nāsti), and thus is free from clinging, clearly perceptive the nature of
conditionality (YS 1) and can state that. But at least some nihilists see all language as
implicating reification and prapañca, and since there are no “real” (sat) referents for
any terms, there are no ultimate truths (Garfield 2014, 47, Siderits 2019, 646). All
language is conventional and distorts reality; any assertion is at best only
conventionally true and nothing is ultimately true (Garfield 2014, 51, 53). Buddhist
Giuseppe Ferraro (2014, 461) also thinks that any attempt to speculate on tattva is a dṛṣṭa) and thus
detrimental soteriologically and so should be abandoned.
27
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doctrines are reduced to a “raft” (Majjhima Nikāya I.22) existing within the
conventional world to get us to the other shore of enlightenment and of no ultimate
reality.28 But these nihilists cannot explain how the Buddha could talk without resorting
to claiming that the Buddha went in and out of enlightened states.
In sum, Nāgārjuna does not reject all ontologies but only svabhāva-based
ontologies of self-contained entities existing or not existing (dṛṣṭis). He advances an
ontology that shows how the Buddhist path can work.
8. “ULTIMATE TRUTH”
In addition, contemporary nihilistic interpreters believe that “ultimate reality” involves
self-existent entities, and since there are no self-existent entities, there can be no
ultimate truths: there is no reality to mirror any claims, and so nothing to state (or at
least any “ultimate truths” are not statable).29 For example, Jay Garfield (2014) believes
that the level of dharmas is “ultimate reality” for Nāgārjuna and since dharmas are
empty, there are no real referents for claims and thus there are no ultimate truths—all
truths reduce to conventional ones. For Mark Siderits, “a statement can be ultimately
true only by virtue of correctly describing an ultimately real entity,” and since there are
no ultimately real entities, there are no ultimate truth (Siderits and Katsura 2013, 304;
also see Siderits 2007, 180-183, 200-204). Garfield (2014, 50) also claims that since
Nāgārjuna identifies dependent-arising and emptiness (MK 24.18, VVV 70, SS 68),
“by implication” conventional and ultimate truth are identified—despite Nāgārjuna
stating that those who do not distinguish conventional and ultimate truth do not see the
profound teach of the Buddha (MK 24.9; see Jones 2014, 51-54).30
For nihilists, there must be ultimate realities (self-existent entities) for there to be
ultimate truths, and since there are no self-existent entities, there can be no ultimate
truths. But ultimate truths are about whatever is real in the final analysis, not
necessarily a depiction of “ultimate entities.” For Nāgārjuna, there is something real in
28

It can be argued that the Buddha never taught a truly “ultimate truth” but only presented a path that
enabled us to end our existential suffering (duḥkha) that results from clinging to false realities (the self
and objects of desire): he had no interest in reality apart from the problem of suffering, and so what
reality is “in itself” apart from his soteriological concern is irrelevant—he remained agnostic about
metaphysical issues related to the ultimate status of the phenomenal world and to any purported
transcendent realities. This may be true, but it does not change the fact that Nāgārjuna presents a picture
of reality that enables the Buddhist path to work, and he presents final “ultimate truths,” not
“conventional truths,” at least within the context of the Buddhist way of life. This does not justify Siderits
and Garfield’s (2013, 659) claim that “[w]hat one needs to know in order to attain liberation is that the
very idea of how things ultimately are is incoherent”—nothing in Nāgārjuna’s texts justify that broader
claim.
29
For a discussion of the problems that such a “mirror theory” of language in mysticism, see Jones 2016,
chap. 6.
30
Classical Indian philosophy does not differentiate “truth” and “reality” in the term “satya” and related
words. Thus, “ultimate truths” and “ultimate reality” become inextricably connected.
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the final analysis (i.e., tattva), and thus there may be truths about it from the highest
point of view or the highest purpose (paramārtha)—self-existent realities are not
needed to ground the truths. Nor do we have to twist claims about emptiness into
conventional truths: claims of emptiness reveal the true ontological status of
conventional entities and thus are ultimate truths—conventional claims are based on
treating entities as self-contained realities, and thus emptiness is false from a
conventional point of view. Since ultimate truths are any truths about the true
ontological status of things in the final analysis, ultimate truths and an ontology of
impermanence are compatible.
Nowhere does Nāgārjuna state that ultimate truths are not statable (see Jones 2014,
54-55). Ultimate truths are not ineffable in any sense for him simply because all
referents are by definition conventional. Tattva itself is “free of being projected upon
by conceptual projections, free of thoughts, and without multiplicity” (MK 18.9), but
Nāgārjuna never says that truths about it (such as that one) cannot be stated. If he
thought so, he would have stated that nothing could be stated about tattva there. Rather,
Buddhists can utilize the conventions of a language to teach ultimate truths (MK 24.10).
So too, the final analysis of the ontological status of entities—how they actually exist
rather than appear conventionally—can be stated, and Nāgārjuna discusses their
emptiness.
In sum, truths are about whatever is real in the final analysis even if that reality is
not self-existent, and they are statable: ultimate truths state the ultimately correct
ontological account of reality. Nāgārjuna states that there are two types of truth, that
the statement of the ultimate truths depends on conventions, and that it is based on the
ultimate truths that one can become enlightened:
[8] The buddhas’ teaching of the doctrine rests upon two categories of truths (satye):
truth based on worldly conventions (loka-saṃvṛti-satyam) and truth from the highest
point of view (satya-paramārthatas). [9] Those who do not discern the distinction of
these two categories of truths do not discern the profound truth (tattvam) in the
teachings of the buddhas. [10] Without relying upon worldly convention
(vyavahāram), the truth from the highest point of view cannot be taught. And without
reaching the truth from the highest point of view, nirvāṇa cannot be achieved (MK
24.8-10).
[69] The ultimate truth (paramārtha) consists of this teaching of emptiness. The
Buddha, while holding to worldly conventions (loka-vyavahāram), conceived the
world properly. [70] Worldly doctrines (laukika-dharmas) are not abolished, but from
the point of view of reality as it really is (tattvatas) the Buddha never taught a doctrine.
But the ignorant do not understand what the Buddha said and are afraid of his spotless
speech (vimala-vacana) (SS 69-70).
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Once one has realized the ultimate truth, one can again utilize concepts to navigate the
world and to lead others to enlightenment. Only conceptual projection is ended
permanently in the enlightened state, not the use of language itself.
Mark Siderits (2007, 203-205) gives a “semantic” interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s
thought rather than the more common “ontological” interpretation, such as the one
presented here. That is, Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness is not about reality but about
what we can say about reality, i.e., about our alleged conceptual claims to truth. Under
this approach, “[w]hen a Mādhyamika says that things are empty, this is not to be
understood as stating the ultimate truth about the ultimate nature of reality. Instead this
is just a useful pedagogical device, a way of instructing others who happen to believe
there is such a thing as the ultimate truth about the ultimate nature of reality” (Siderits
and Katsura 2013, 247). According to the semantic interpretation, “the point of
emptiness is to undermine the very idea of an ultimate reality with its ultimate nature”
(Siderits and Garfield 2013, 657). All statements are conventional and actually falsify
reality (Siderits 2019, 646). For Siderits, Athe ultimate nature of reality is something
that is inexpressible and only cognizable nonconceptually because, there being no
ultimately real entities to figure in truth-makers for purported descriptions of the
ultimate nature of reality, no such description (including ‘inexpressible’ and
‘unconceptualizable’) can be asserted” (2015, 120-121). Siderits may reject tattva as a
reality, but even if he accepted a reality such as tattva, he would still have to deny that
anything could be said about it. Such a position may be defendable on philosophical
grounds, but it is hard to defend from Nāgārjuna’s works: it reduces all truths to
conventional truths, and Nāgārjuna is prepared to say some general things about tattva
(e.g., in MK 18.9), as discussed above.
So too, contra Siderits, Nāgārjuna, as discussed above, accepts conceptions and
does not reduce them all conceptualization to prapañca (contra Siderits 2019, 645).
And as part of those conceptions, the enlightened can present an ontology to render
understandable what was experienced in the enlightened state. Here, Nāgārjuna has an
ontology of that-ness of the phenomenal world and the emptiness of conceptualized
entities. And he states ultimate truths. He can use conventional concepts to depict the
arising and falling of empty phenomena as dependent upon causes and conditions
without projecting the idea of self-contained entities onto reality and can explain that
reality in terms of its sheer that-ness.
9. CONTEMPORARY DISCUSSIONS
OF MEREOLOGICAL NIHILISM AND DEFLATIONISM
Ontological nihilism has become a much-discussed topic in contemporary AngloAmerican metaphysics. “Ontological nihilism” here does not mean literal
nothingness—in Jason Turner’s words (2011, 4), that reality is “an unstructured and
undifferentiated blob, but without the blob.” No contemporary Western philosopher
goes as far as nihilistic interpreters of Nāgārjuna and denies that something exists.
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Rather, ontological nihilism is a form of anti-realism and reductionism concerning
whether conventional objects (or any objects) exist (see Jones 2013, 13-15). That is, it
is a matter of the composition of complex entities: nothing real has parts, but the parts
exist. Thus, this is “compositional” or “mereological” nihilism concerning the relation
of wholes to their parts—any composite entity is not actually real, only their most basic
components are. Nihilists today deny that everyday objects and properties such as
tables and chairs and colors are real, but they affirm either that fundamental objects
exist (moderate nihilism) or that at least fundamental properties arising from the spacetime continuum exist (radical nihilism).
Thus, conventional objects are reduced either to whatever are the most fundamental
objects discovered in quantum physics or to the fundamental properties instantiated in
space-time without there being any discrete objects. Composite objects are simply
arrangements of elementary objects. Conventional language about everyday entities is
not discarded since talk about “tables” and “chairs” can be paraphrased properly in
terms of the true ontological parts of reality. For example, for Ted Sider (2014, 257),
the statement “There are tables” can be restated as “Some mereological simples are
arranged table-wise.” Both the ordinary description and the restated ontologically
correct description describe the same facts. (How to restate conventional claims
without a commitment to some type of objects has proved to be an issue [see Diehl
2018].) In radical nihilism, only the reality of the space-time continuum and properties
is affirmed. In more extreme forms, all there really is is just atomless and structureless
stuff—or to use the technical philosophical term introduced by David Lewis (1991,
20), “gunk.” Parts divide into smaller and smaller parts forever—all that is real is an
amorphous lump. In a gunk universe, the true ontology has only one entry: gunk (see
Le Bihan 2013). Ontological nihilisms with determinate parts or properties have more
complex fundamental ontologies.
Nāgārjuna brings something new to this situation. The new developments in
Western philosophy make mereological nihilism respectable, and Nāgārjuna might be
called a “mereological nihilist,” even though he accepts bhāvas as “conventionally
real”—a category not in contemporary ontological nihilists’ ontologies. But his
distinction of “two truths” dovetails with the new nihilism: conventional truths are
affirmed for everyday discourse, and ultimate truths are in terms of the ultimate
components of reality (the dharmas). He also agrees that conventional truths are
deceptive since the entities involved in them—bhāvas—are not the ultimately real
components of reality: from the point of view of an ultimate ontology, tables and chairs
do not exist as “real” (sat) entities, although there is a reality behind them.
However, Nāgārjuna differs from contemporary philosophers concerning the nature
of the ultimate components of reality. The Western philosophers let physics determine
what the most fundamental components are—the components are either the smallest
particles in space-time or the properties arising from space-time. But Nāgārjuna sees
the ultimate construction of the phenomenal world in terms of basic components of our
experience—the dharmas. As a Buddhist, Nāgārjuna is interested in how our
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experience of the world causes our suffering, not the nature of the world independent
of our experience. Hence, his focus is on the fundamental components of experience.
Dharmas are not material-like particles or properties, unlike the simples in physics.
Also unlike the simples in physics, Nāgārjuna advocates the direct experience of tattva
(i.e., an experience of the “that-ness” of phenomenal reality)—a topic of no interest to
contemporary nihilists. In directly experiencing the components of experience, we
experience the world free of our culturally-constructed categories and concepts.
In sum, Nāgārjuna’s mereological nihilism takes a different tack than do
contemporary Western versions in that the ultimate simples are not material. This leads
to other differences from contemporary metaphysics. As discussed above, the dharmas,
like the entities of the everyday world (the bhāvas), are empty of anything that would
make them self-existent (svabhāva). Thus, the fundamental components of our
experience are not any more “real” in the sense of being self-contained realities than
everyday entities. But, as Nāgārjuna’s critics argue, if the fundamental components are
not real, how can this lead to anything but literal nihilism? How can Nāgārjuna be
committed to something if it is not real? However, as discussed, “self-existence” is not
Nāgārjuna’s only criterion for being real: dharmas are “real” even if they are
conditioned and not self-existent.
And as discussed above, unlike a pure gunk world, Nāgārjuna also affirms a
fundamental reality to the phenomena world behind our conceptionsCtattva. Tattva has
structures: dharmas have a genuine structure despite not having any self-existent
substance, and the lawfulness of dependent-arising also indicates structure. The
dharmas are not our fabrications but the components of our experienced world even
though they arise and cease conditionally and thus are not self-contained entities—they
are the real “factors of our experiences.” In their dharmic analyses of what is real,
Buddhist Abhidharma schools distinguish dozens and dozens of dharmas connected to
sense-experience, emotions, and other mental states, but there is only one category for
“matter”—“form” (rūpa). And even there the dharma relates only to our experience,
not to “matter in itself”—it is about the form of things as we experience them, not what
they may be independent of our experience. By naming things, we give what is actually
real a form—hence, the common phrase for the physical world: “name and form (nāmārūpa).” Dharmas are mereological simples, but tattva is not built out of them—it is not
as if tattva is assembled by adding the dharmic parts together, any more than spacetime for contemporary nihilists is built up from fundamental particles. Still, dharmas
provide definite structures to tattva even if for Nāgārjuna they are not fixed entities but
empty of any svabhāva. This disavowal of self-existent components distinguishes
Nāgārjuna from the Abhidharma schools.
In sum, tattva is not empty of structured realities. But Nāgārjuna’s fundamental
reality is in terms of the experienced stuff existing independently of our
conceptualizations, not fundamental particles—he accepts language even though there
are no fixed entities in the world to be referents. Thus, he would disagree with Jason
Turner (2011) over the need for fundamental objects in how we see the world. But as
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discussed, he states very little about the actual nature of tattva. Thus, he may well have
agreed that language is object-oriented and agreed that there is a problem for any
language in expressing a fundamental reality devoid of discrete objects but would not
reject his ontology for that reason.
This also impacts the issue of “ontological deflation” in the sense used by David
Chalmers (2009), i.e., the rejection of the entire metaphysical project of finding the
fundamental elements of reality because we cannot find ultimate truths in this field.
Thus, no fundamental ontology should be espoused. To be more precise, some have
argued Nāgārjuna’s project entails a weak deflationism in that he refuses the ultimate
reality of entities and dharmas but accepts the conventional world as long as we do not
take it without any ontological commitments—i.e., that we do not take bhavas and
dharmas to be self-existent realities (MacKenzie 2008, Gandolfo 2016). In short,
Nāgārjuna deflates the ontology of conventional entities and does not espouse any
ultimate ontology. In this deflationism, we can make claims about conventional entities
without requiring any commitment to their ultimate reality or foundations—any claim
of a fundamental ontology is a dependent designation and thus dependently arisen
(MacKenzie 2008, 204). However, as discussed, while Nāgārjuna mainly discusses
why there are no ultimately real entities (in the sense of svabhāva), he does affirm a
robust reality beyond our conceptualized entities, and that makes any deflationist
interpretation hard to maintain. That Nāgārjuna ends his principal world by affirming
that the Buddha taught a “true doctrine” (MK 27.30) also must make deflationists
scramble (see Gandolfo 2016, 220-223).
10. CONCLUSION
Nāgārjuna’s writings are terse enough to have led to a fascinating variety of
interpretations—and not just on the issue of ontological nihilism—and none can be
defended as obviously the best. The differences have led to many long articles and
books, and the disputes seep down to translations of verses. But the equation of
emptiness (śunyatā) with nothingness by both Jay Garfield and Mark Siderits leads to
paradoxes that only confuse the issues—“The ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate
truth,” “The ultimate reality is that there is no ultimate reality.”31 Such contradictions
would normally be a reductio ad absurdum of their positions, but they actually enjoy
espousing paradoxes. Their denial of ultimate truths or the equation of ultimate and
conventional truths explicitly also goes against what Nāgārjuna actually wrote about
the “profound teaching” of the Buddha (MK 24.9) and so should be grounds to reject
their positions as possibly valid interpretations of Nāgārjuna. Instead their position has
become fashionable. David Burton and Thomas Woods also equate emptiness with the
31

Mark Siderits may have meant the claim “The ultimate is that there is no ultimate truth” (Siderits and
Katsura 2013, 273) only rhetorically to grab people’s attention rather than literally, but he accepts that
others (including Jay Garfield) embrace the paradoxical reading (Siderits and Garfield 2013, 658). (See
Jones 2018a.)
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total lack of any reality. But this goes against Nāgārjuna’s “middle way” that avoids
the nihilist extreme, not to mention going against all empirical evidence (Oetke 1996,
99). At least Jan Westerhoff (2016) admits that his philosophical defense of
Madhyamaka=s alleged nihilism is not an argument that can be found in Nāgārjuna’s
works.
Moreover, nihilism is hard to defend when there is instead a straightforward
interpretation of the emptiness of entities based on verses that entail that a reality—
tattva—remains once we stop projecting self-existence onto empty entities. The
nihilists= error centers on thinking that for Nāgārjuna either entities must be selfexistent or nothing is real. But tattva is not made up of bhāvas or dharmas. Making
tattva a central piece of the puzzle offers a simpler and more consistent reading of
Nāgārjuna’s works, one that does not have to deny the plain meaning of passages or
that boxes a commentator into the corner with paradoxes. Entities can then be free of
self-existence without the specter of nihilism rising. Indeed, if Nāgārjuna’s notion of
“tattva” were given more prominence in modern discussions of his texts, the popularity
of the nihilist interpretations would dwindle away.
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